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KEEPING THE “CIVIL” IN CIVIL LITIGATION:
THE NEED FOR A PUNITIVE DAMAGE–
ACTUAL DAMAGE LINK IN TITLE VII CASES
DAVID C. SEARLE
INTRODUCTION
Most jurisdictions subscribe to the common law rule that a plain-
tiff must be awarded actual damages before recovering punitive dam-
ages.1 This rule stems from the view that without a finding of actual
damages, there effectively exists no cause of action to support a puni-
tive damage award.2 Moreover, a plaintiff who is unable to show
damages worthy of compensation is seen by the common law as unde-
serving of the potential windfall provided by punitive damages.3
Despite the desirability of the common law rule, Congress for-
sook it in drafting civil rights legislation, most particularly Title VII.4
When Congress amended Title VII through the enactment of § 1981a
in 1991,5 it did not explicitly require that workplace discrimination
plaintiffs be awarded actual damages before receiving punitive dam-
Copyright © 2002 by David C. Searle.
1. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 14 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]; Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Sufficiency
of Showing of Actual Damages to Support Award of Punitive Damages—Modern Cases, 40
A.L.R.4th 11, 18–19 (1985).
2. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 14 (noting that, if the punitive damage–
actual damage link is not satisfied, “there is no cause of action at all, and nothing to support the
award”).
3. See, e.g., Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888) (noting that a plaintiff who has
suffered no actual damages “has no right to maintain an action merely to inflict punishment
upon some supposed wrong-doer”); Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70
S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902) (same).
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the employment
context on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74.
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age awards. This omission has resulted in some trial courts permitting
juries to award punitive damages, sometimes running into the hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, in Title VII cases when neither com-
pensatory nor nominal damages have been found.6 Some reviewing
courts have upheld these awards by reasoning that mere liability un-
der Title VII is all that is required to support a punitive damage
award.7 Other courts have held steadfast to the common law rule by
requiring that a plaintiff be awarded either compensatory or nominal
damages before receiving an award of punitive damages.8 The circuit
split has resulted from a disagreement not only as to the propriety of
the actual damage–punitive damage link, but also as to whether a
prevailing plaintiff is presumptively injured when a defendant is
found liable under Title VII.
Although neither the plain text of § 1981a nor federal common
law explicitly requires an actual damage–punitive damage link, such a
link is necessary to maintain the integrity of punitive damage awards
in Title VII cases. Courts that have circumvented this link by requir-
ing only a Title VII violation, but not compensatory or even nominal
damages before an award of punitive damages, run the risk of con-
verting civil actions into quasi-criminal proceedings, raising concerns
of fundamental fairness and constitutional due process. In Part I, I
discuss the basic rationale underlying the common law rule that actual
damages be a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, noting
that this rule is consistent with the separate functions of the civil and
criminal justice systems, as well as the contemporary justifications for
6. E.g., Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1214 (1st Cir. 1995) (reviewing a
trial court Title VII punitive damage award of $300,000 that was unsupported by either actual or
nominal damages); Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding, in affirming a jury’s finding of zero actual damages and $100,000 punitive damages,
“that there is no requirement that an award of punitive damages under Title VII be accompa-
nied by an award of compensatory or nominal damages”).
7. E.g., Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
“in Title VII cases, where the factfinder has found in a plaintiff’s favor that the defendant en-
gaged in prohibited discrimination, punitive damages may be awarded . . . regardless of whether
the plaintiff also receives an award of compensatory or nominal damages”); Timm v. Progres-
sive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a jury award of punitive
damages without accompanying compensatory damages to the plaintiff, and noting in particular
that the jury instructions did not invite jurors “to award punitive damages even if they believed
that Timm had not been the victim of sex discrimination”).
8. Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1215 (concluding that a liability verdict under Title VII does not
compel an award of nominal damages). In cases involving punitive damages under the federal
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994), a provision very similar to § 1981a(b)(1), both the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have found that punitive damages must be accompanied by either
compensatory or nominal damages. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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punitive damages. I also show that a failure to satisfy the actual dam-
age–punitive damage link renders a punitive damage award constitu-
tionally “excessive” under the Supreme Court’s decision in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore.9 In Part II, I critique the reasoning of
those courts that have deemed the actual damage–punitive damage
link satisfied by presuming injury upon a violation of Title VII. I con-
clude that this is an inadequate response to the concerns underlying
the common law rule, and that these courts have overstepped their
bounds by making such a bold and far-reaching presumption.
I.  THE NEED FOR AN ACTUAL DAMAGE–PUNITIVE DAMAGE LINK
A majority of states require that a punitive damage award be
predicated upon actual damages, whether compensatory or nominal.10
Congress did not explicitly adopt this rule in drafting civil rights leg-
islation, including Title VII. Some courts have concluded simply that
as a matter of federal common law, it is unnecessary to find any dam-
ages, whether compensatory or nominal, before permitting a punitive
damage award in a Title VII action.11 Such a conclusion not only
overlooks the important justifications behind the common law rule, it
may in fact deprive defendants of their constitutional rights of due
process.
A. Origins of the Common Law Rule
The common law requirement that punitive damages be accom-
panied by an award of actual damages has its genesis in two funda-
mental foundations of the law that are intimately tied together: the
separate functions of civil and criminal law,12 and the punishment and
deterrence justifications for punitive damages.13
9. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. Cush-Crawford, 271 F.3d at 359; Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010; Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d
487, 492 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting in dicta “that a finding of actual damages is not a condition to
the award of punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1968”) (citing Rogers v. Loether,
467 F.2d 1110, 1112 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974));
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87–88 (3d Cir. 1965) (holding that federal common law does not
prevent an award of punitive damages in a civil rights case where no actual damages are found).
12. See, e.g., Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496, 501 (1873) (noting that “[p]utting money in the
plaintiff’s pocket would be no satisfaction to the public for a violated penal statute”); Hoagland
v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902) (noting that a civil plain-
tiff cannot “maintain an action merely to inflict punishment upon some supposed wrongdoer”).
13. See, e.g., Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888) (noting that punitive damages
are given “upon the theory that the defendant deserves punishment for his wrongful acts”);
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Traditionally, criminal law is seen as the area of law primarily re-
sponsible for punishing deviant conduct, whereas the civil system is
the avenue by which plaintiffs are compensated for their losses.14 In
criminal law, “there is emphasis on a bad mind,” but “[w]ith torts the
emphasis is more on ‘the adjustment of the conflicting interests of the
individuals to achieve a desirable social result,’ with morality taking
on less importance.”15 The exception to this general rule, and perhaps
the sole bridge linking civil law to criminal law, is punitive damages.16
These damages originally were sanctioned both as a means of pun-
ishing particularly reprehensible conduct on the part of defendants,
and of compensating plaintiffs for interests either not entitled to legal
protection under the common law or not easily calculable.17 Today,
however, the Supreme Court characterizes punitive damages solely as
serving the twin aims of punishment and deterrence,18 the two goals
most commonly associated with criminal law.19
Nonetheless, at least in the minds of supporters, punitive dam-
ages serve a key function. For reprehensible conduct that otherwise
might escape punishment through the criminal law, either because the
legislature has not found such conduct worthy of criminalizing or be-
cause of a lack of prosecutorial resources, punitive damages fill the
gaps created by the criminal law’s shortcomings.20 Consistent with this
view, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process right of notice, normally associated with criminal law,
Zedd v. Jenkins, 74 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Va. 1953) (reviewing the rationale for the common law re-
quirement that actual damages be a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, and con-
cluding that compensatory damages are awarded as “compensation for [a] pecuniary loss,”
while punitive damages are awarded “as a punishment to defendant”).
14. WAYNE R. LA FAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at
10–14 (1972).
15. Id. § 3, at 11.
16. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 9 (noting in regard to punitive damages
that “[i]n one rather anomalous respect . . . the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded
the field of torts”).
17. 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2:02, at 2-5 (2d ed. 2000).
18. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
19. In 1877, Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: “It is difficult on
principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has been fully compensated for his suf-
fering he should recover anything more.” Bass v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877)
(Ryan, C.J., concurring).
20. 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 17, § 2:20, at 2-6 (stating that punitive damages
“afford the means to punish, through the civil law, conduct which might otherwise escape pun-
ishment through the criminal law”).
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must be satisfied when punitive damages are assessed against a de-
fendant.21
Even with this procedural safeguard, the use of punitive damages
in the civil law undoubtedly raises questions concerning a defendant’s
constitutional rights, as well as fundamental concerns of fairness.22
First, unlike criminal statutes, which have their maximum penalties
fixed by statute, there is no limit to the amount of punitive damages
that a jury may impose, except in the rare instance they are found
“excessive” by the court.23 In addition, the technical distinctions be-
tween civil and criminal trials, including the disparate burdens of
proof and the ability of a criminal defendant to raise the right against
self-incrimination, caution against inflicting punishment through the
civil justice system.24 Finally, with respect to Title VII actions, some
commentators stress the unfairness of extracting punitive damages
from employers whose liability often rests not on their own “repre-
hensible” actions, but rather for the improper acts of their employees
under respondeat superior.25
Inherent in the common law requirement of an actual–punitive
damage link is the principle that the civil and criminal justice systems,
to the extent possible, should be kept separate.26 Although punitive
damages add elements of punishment and deterrence—aspects of
criminal law—to the civil system, a civil cause of action must foremost
allege an injury to the plaintiff.27 Civil plaintiffs must enter the court-
house seeking compensation and the vindication of their rights first,
with punitive damages as a secondary aspect of the claim. By award-
ing punitive damages only when they are “incident” to an action for
21. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (“The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on
a tortfeasor.”) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).
22. Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive Dam-
age Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1591 (1997) (“As the states have recognized, procedural
safeguards are needed to protect defendants from the wrongful imposition of these quasi-
criminal sanctions and to protect the integrity of the legal system.”).
23. 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 17, § 2:12, at 2-28.
24. Id. § 2:12, at 2-29.
25. Id. § 2:04, at 2-11 (“A weakness in the argument, that punitive damages serve as a nec-
essary civil punishment, becomes evident when consideration is given to the policy of allowing
vicarious liability for those damages.”).
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27. Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888) (stating that punitive damages “are
never more than incidents to some action for real and substantial damages suffered by the plain-
tiff; and, when given, they are given only in addition to the real and actual damages suffered and
recovered by him”).
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“real and substantial damages,”28 and not in situations in which the
jury is unable to conclude that the plaintiff has been harmed, the
common law rule prevents unharmed plaintiffs from maintaining ac-
tions merely as a way of extracting fines from public wrongdoers.
The common law requirement that a punitive damage award be
accompanied by actual damages grew out of a concern that the civil
law might be used as a replacement for criminal law.29 The rule stems
from the view that although a plaintiff has the right to use the civil
justice system to seek compensation for a loss, he never has the “right
to maintain an action merely to inflict punishment upon some sup-
posed wrongdoer.”30 And the common law view is that where a jury
does not award a plaintiff actual damages or at least nominal damages
signifying the invasion of a legal right, there is no cause of action at
all, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages.31
B. The Role of the Common Law Rule
By ensuring that the civil justice system remains committed pri-
marily to compensation and not punishment, the common law rule
protects both fundamental notions of fairness and the constitutional
rights of civil defendants. Once a jury concludes that a plaintiff is not
entitled to even nominal damages, any further proceeding against the
defendant becomes quasi-criminal in nature since the issue of puni-
tive damages is no longer subsumed in the underlying civil cause of
action. That is, a case that began as a bona fide civil proceeding with
an alleged injury in fact is transformed into a quasi-criminal pro-
ceeding once damages are refused, with the unharmed plaintiff taking
the place of the state. Despite the criminal nature of such a proceed-
ing, a defendant facing the prospect of punitive damages lacks the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.32 In addition, the civil
plaintiff need not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to get
28. Id.
29. See Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902)
(noting that a plaintiff cannot use the civil justice system as a way of punishing tortfeasors, but
rather must use it as a means of obtaining compensation for losses).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496, 500–01 (1873) (holding that a plaintiff cannot main-
tain an action to recover only punitive damages and that punitive damages may be awarded only
if compensatory damages have been awarded); Schippel, 16 P. at 807 (same); Gilmore v.
Mathews, 67 Me. 517, 522 (1877) (same); Hoagland, 70 S.W. at 880 (same); Zedd v. Jenkins, 74
S.E.2d 791, 793 (Va. 1953) (same).
32. 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 17, § 2:12, at 2-29.
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a “conviction.”33 For these reasons,34 the common law prudently cau-
tions against blurring the line between civil and criminal law.
Additional factors favor the common law rule. First, permitting
an unharmed plaintiff to collect private fines against a defendant is
unfair, particularly when the Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff
never has an independent right to recover punitive damages.35 It is
hard to see how society’s interests can be furthered when the un-
harmed plaintiff, and not the state, is the award recipient.36 Not only is
the plaintiff without standing to bring a merely punitive action against
the defendant,37 but allowing recovery without harm also may over-
deter certain types of conduct.38 Without a requirement that actual
damages be demonstrated, the potential windfall provided by puni-
tive damages would give private “prosecutors” a strong incentive to
roam the countryside looking for wrongdoers.39 In fact, concerns with
overdeterring certain types of conduct, as well as reservations about
lining the pockets of undeserving plaintiffs, are central reasons for the
enactment of many state statutes that have reformed procedures for
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983) (noting that punitive damages are “never
awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct”).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979):
Although the purposes are the same, the effect of a civil judgment for punitive dam-
ages is not the same at [sic] that of a fine imposed after a conviction of a crime, since
the successful plaintiff and not the state is entitled to the money required to be paid
by the defendant.
37. See id. cmt. b (noting that, before damages may be awarded, “a cause of action for the
particular tort must exist”) (emphasis added); supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
38. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 57 (1982) (noting that potential liability for uncertain amounts of punitive damages
may lead to both under- and overdeterrence); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Phar-
maceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1455 (1994) (“[T]here can be great difficulty in determining the ap-
propriate additional [punitive damage] award necessary to create appropriate deterrence, but
not over-deterrence.”).
39. Of course, as Judge Frank H. Easterbrook pointed out in Timm v. Progressive Steel
Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998), a plaintiff still must have standing before bringing a
Title VII action. Id. at 1010. Thus, these private prosecutors still would have to allege an injury
in fact before bringing a civil cause of action against a wrongdoer. Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Nevertheless, there is a void between a properly pleaded allega-
tion of injury and a jury’s determination of whether the injury actually occurred at the behest of
the defendant. If these two were one and the same, a plaintiff would never have to demonstrate
injury before recovering actual damages.
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awarding punitive damages.40 Lastly, some commentators suggest that
there is really no societal interest in deterring conduct that does not
result in compensable damage.41 Consistent with this view, some
states require that punitive damages be accompanied by compensa-
tory damages, and not just nominal damages.42
C. Constitutionally Excessive Punitive Damage Awards
An examination of punitive damage awards that are unsupported
by actual damages should begin with consideration of the additional
common law rule that requires a punitive damage award to bear a
“reasonable relationship” to the amount of actual damages.43 Without
an award of actual damages, one cannot say logically that there is a
“ratio” or “reasonable relationship” between the two. Although it is
probably a stretch to say that there is a “reasonable relationship” be-
tween a sizable punitive damage award and nominal damages of one
dollar, any punitive damage award when there are no actual damages
results in an infinite ratio that is inherently unreasonable.44
40. Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and Ex-
cessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 118 (1994) (discussing the deterrence and anti-
windfall rationales of “split-recovery” punitive damage reform measures that have been
adopted by several states).
41. Robert W. Pritchard, Comment, The Due Process Implications of Ohio’s Punitive
Damages Law—A Change Must Be Made, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1207, 1228 (1994) (claiming
that the rationale for requiring actual damages as a prerequisite for punitive damages is that
“[s]ociety does not need to punish or deter behavior that results in no compensable harm”).
42. E.g., SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 N.E.2d 341, 349–50 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (stating that punitive damages may be awarded only where compensatory damages are
also awarded); Newton v. Yates, 353 N.E.2d 485, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that in Indi-
ana, a punitive damage award must be accompanied by compensatory damages). Whether this
rule is tenable is irrelevant to the claim of this Note that punitive damage awards should be ac-
companied by compensatory or nominal damages.
43. See, e.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Shuster, 575 P.2d 350, 352–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(finding that a punitive damage award of $30,000 that was supported by only one dollar in
nominal damages was “excessive” on the ground that there was no “reasonable relationship”
between the awards). In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme
Court cited several nineteenth century cases in support of the common law rule that punitive
damages must bear a “reasonable relationship” to actual damages. Id. at 580 n.32 (citing, inter
alia, Saunders v. Mullen, 24 N.W. 529, 529 (Iowa 1885) (“When the actual damages are so small,
the amount allowed as exemplary damages should not be so large.”); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La.
Ann. 447, 448 (1852) (“[E]xemplary damages allowed should bear some proportion to the real
damage sustained . . . .”)).
44. See Newton, 353 N.E.2d at 491 (stating that because Indiana courts follow the rule that
punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, it was
“but a short and logical step” to require compensatory damages as a prerequisite to any award
of punitive damages). Still, it might seem extreme and somewhat inflexible to label all punitive
damage awards predicated on zero actual damages as unconstitutionally “excessive.” For exam-
SEARLE.DOC 05/07/02 10:55 AM
2002] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1691
The common law’s requirement of a “reasonable relationship”
between punitive and actual damages traditionally has served as a
check on excessive punitive damage awards,45 and was adopted by the
Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore46 as one of
the three “guideposts” for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive
damage awards.47 In BMW, the Supreme Court labeled the ratio of a
punitive damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff as
the “most commonly cited indicium” of whether a punitive damage
award is unreasonable or excessive.48 As a slight variation on this rule,
the BMW Court reiterated its previous holding in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.49 that there must be a “‘reasonable
relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely
to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actu-
ally has occurred.’”50 Consistent with this idea, several states have
sought to curb overly zealous punitive damage awards by prescribing
maximum ratios of punitive damages to actual damages.51 Such rules
comport with the common law of nearly all states that prohibits puni-
tive damage awards absent actual damages.
Although the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line mathematical
approach to determining a constitutionally permissible actual dam-
age–punitive damage ratio,52 the Court nevertheless has evaluated the
“excessiveness” of punitive damage awards in the context of mathe-
ple, one could concoct an unlikely situation where zero dollars are awarded as actual damages,
but the jury finds punitive damages of one dollar. Although perhaps technically “excessive,”
such an award almost certainly does not meet the type of “excessiveness” that the Supreme
Court sought to roll back in BMW. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 585 (noting that a punitive damage
award of $2 million cannot be legitimized in the particular case where it is “tantamount to a se-
vere criminal penalty”). One dollar in punitive damages almost surely does not amount to a “se-
vere” criminal penalty.
45. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 14–15.
46. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
47. The other two guideposts set forth by the BMW Court to evaluate the constitutionality
of punitive damage awards are the “degree of reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct, id.
at 575–80, and the “sanctions for comparable misconduct,” id. at 583–85.
48. Id. at 580.
49. 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993).
50. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp, 509 U.S. at 460).
51. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-102(1)(a), (3) (2001) (stating that punitive damage
awards are capped at the amount of actual damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1991) (cap-
ping punitive damages at double the amount of compensatory damages in product liability
cases); FLA. ANN. STAT. §§ 768.73(1)(a), (b) (West 1997) (capping, for most cases, punitive
damages at three times compensatory damages).
52. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitu-
tional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula . . . .”).
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matical ratios.53 There is no precedent for upholding an infinite ratio
of punitive damages to actual damages under the BMW standard.54 If
a court were to do so, it would be faced with the insurmountable task
of defining what constitutes “reasonable” punitive damages when
zero actual damages are found. Indeed, punitive damage awards un-
supported by actual damages appear on their face to violate the
common law rule that punitive damages must bear a “reasonable rela-
tionship” to compensatory damages.55
This apparent simplicity is complicated by the BMW Court’s
holding that the proper inquiry is whether a “reasonable relationship”
exists not only between the punitive damage award and the actual
harm that has occurred, but also between the punitive damage award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct.56 But
without even an award of nominal damages, it is impossible to calcu-
late this potential harm. Courts that have reviewed punitive damage
awards in Title VII cases often have looked beyond the ratio of puni-
tive damages to actual damages, instead focusing on language from
BMW indicating that a “higher” ratio may be appropriate where “a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of eco-
nomic damages” or where “the monetary value of noneconomic harm
might have been difficult to determine.”57 As an extreme example, in
one Title VII case the Sixth Circuit applied the BMW ratio standard
to a punitive damage award of $300,000 that was based upon $1 in
compensatory damages.58 In affirming the award, the appeals court
found that the punitive damage–actual damage ratio of 300,000:1,
blistering when compared to the 500:1 ratio that the BMW Court de-
scribed as sufficient to “raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow,”59 was jus-
53. Id. (“The $2 million in punitive damages awarded to Dr. Gore by the Alabama Su-
preme Court is 500 times the amount of his actual harm as determined by the jury.”). In BMW,
the Court noted that a punitive damage–actual damage ratio of 500:1 must surely “raise a suspi-
cious judicial eyebrow.” Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
54. The requirement that punitive damages bear a “reasonable relationship” to the actual
harm that has occurred or the harm likely to result if the defendant’s conduct was to continue
unchecked cannot be satisfied, by definition, if the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages
is “infinite.” Surely, this cannot be the case if a ratio of 500:1 is sufficient to “raise a suspicious
judicial eyebrow.” Id.
55. Id. at 580.
56. Id. at 581.
57. Id. at 582.
58. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 515 (6th Cir. 2001).
59. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
481 (1998) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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tified simply to “support the deterrent purpose of Title VII.”60 But a
deterrent purpose is not enough to legitimize a punitive damage
award when there are no actual damages.61
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed punitive damage–ac-
tual damage ratios of several hundred to one,62 it has never legiti-
mized an infinite ratio. Where there are no actual damages, it is im-
possible to quantify the harm that “may have resulted” had the
defendant’s harassing conduct continued.63 Nor can it be said that the
damages from “personal injury” or other noneconomic harm are dif-
ficult to measure; without even nominal damages to signify the inva-
sion of a right, they simply cannot be said to exist. As a result, puni-
tive damage awards unsupported by actual damages cannot be
squared with the common law rule, as adopted by the Supreme Court
in BMW, requiring a “reasonable relationship” between punitive and
actual damages.
II.  CIRCUMVENTING THE COMMON LAW LINK
By requiring that a plaintiff first receive either actual or nominal
damages signifying injury, the common law rule ensures that only
truly harmed plaintiffs have the opportunity to recover punitive dam-
ages.64 In a sense, all courts uphold part of the common law link by
requiring that the trier of fact first find liability on the part of the de-
fendant before moving to the issue of punitive damages. But some
federal courts have circumvented the common law rule and its ration-
ale by presuming the existence of injury upon a violation of Title
VII.65 Precedent does not support such a presumption, which is
60. Harbert-Yeargin, 266 F.3d at 515.
61. See supra Part I.A.
62. See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 459 (affirming a punitive damage–actual damage ratio of
over 526:1).
63. One answer may be that Congress placed a cap on the amount of combined compensa-
tory and punitive damages that an employer is potentially liable for in a Title VII suit. In fact, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D) (1994) staircases this potential amount based upon the employer’s
size, as determined by its number of employees. For example, an employer of five hundred per-
sons or more is potentially liable for up to $300,000 in combined compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. But to say, in all cases, that this statutory cap represents the harm likely to result
from a particular defendant’s conduct would be to render the second prong of the BMW test
nugatory in Title VII actions.
64. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
65. See Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that in
Title VII cases, “where the factfinder has found in a plaintiff’s favor that the defendant engaged
in the prohibited discrimination, punitive damages may be awarded . . . regardless whether the
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equivalent to an automatic award of nominal damages that would
technically satisfy the common law link,66 and for good reason. In Ti-
tle VII suits under § 1981a, the actual damage–punitive damage link
should be satisfied only when the jury first finds the existence of ac-
tual damages, and not when injury is presumed post hoc.
A. The Ambiguity of § 1981a
The plain language of § 1981a(b)(1) does not indicate whether
actual damages are a prerequisite to punitive damage awards in Title
VII cases. Instead, the statute provides merely that a plaintiff may re-
cover punitive damages upon demonstrating that the defendant “en-
gaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights
of an aggrieved individual.”67 In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n,68
the Supreme Court concluded that although Congress sought to make
punitive damages available in only a “subset” of Title VII cases,69 a
plaintiff is required to show only an employer’s “malice” or “reckless
indifference” as exhibited by its state of mind, and not necessarily its
actions, to meet the threshold requirement of § 1981a(b)(1).70
Curiously, the legislative history of § 1981a can be read as sug-
gesting that actual damages are a prerequisite to punitive damages:
“Plaintiffs must first prove intentional discrimination, then must
prove actual injury or loss arising therefrom to recover compensatory
damages, and must meet an even higher standard (establishing that
the employer acted with malice or reckless or callous indifference to
their rights) to recover punitive damages.”71 This legislative history
suggests that Congress intended that punitive damages be awarded
only where the plaintiff has first established some actual damages.
Nevertheless, no circuit court has construed the legislative history of
plaintiff also receives an award of compensatory or nominal damages”); Timm v. Progressive
Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (comparing Title VII liability to a consti-
tutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), in which “punitive damages can be awarded
when the jury has awarded no compensatory or at least nominal damages”).
66. Nominal damages are awarded “where there is no substantial loss or injury to be com-
pensated, but still the law recognizes a technical invasion of [the plaintiff’s] rights or a breach of
the defendant’s duty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390, 392 (6th ed. 1990).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
68. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
69. Id. at 534.
70. Id. at 534–35.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. I, at 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610.
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§ 1981a as being so precise, finding ambiguity as to whether Congress
intended to require an actual damage–punitive damage link under
§ 1981a(b)(1).72
B. Presumption of Injury: An Inadequate Substitute for the Common
Law Link
A court’s presumption of injury or automatic award of nominal
damages upon a finding of liability under Title VII both give short-
shrift to the justifications behind the common law rule. In such cir-
cumstances, there is an insufficient showing of injury by the plaintiff
to warrant an assessment of punitive damages against the defendant.
Alarmingly, the courts that have presumed the existence of injury in
Title VII cases have done so post hoc, thus substituting their judg-
ment for that of the jury.73 If the spirit of the common law rule is to be
upheld, a presumption of injury that replaces a jury finding of nomi-
nal damages cannot exist under Title VII.
In Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc.,74 a jury awarded
$15,000 in punitive damages, but no compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, after finding the defendant employer vicariously liable for the
sex discrimination of a supervisor.75 In concluding that a jury may
award punitive damages even when it “determines that the plaintiff
did not suffer injury,”76 the Seventh Circuit speculated that the lack of
compensatory damages was attributable to the fact that the plaintiff, a
former prison guard, was used to “rough treatment,” while the lack of
nominal damages was due to a lack of jury instructions on the issue.77
The court went on to eschew the common law rule as an attempt to
72. See Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (not-
ing, after looking only to the plain text of § 1981a and failing to consider legislative history, that
“[e]xtra-statutory requirements for recovery should not be invented”); Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (1st Cir. 1995) (opting not to consider the legislative history of
§ 1981a, and instead relying strictly upon the common law rule in concluding that punitive dam-
ages are not awardable under § 1981a(b)(1) absent actual damages).
73. See Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010 (observing that at trial the jury was not given the opportu-
nity to decide whether nominal damages were warranted in part because they were never given
an instruction about them); Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 845 (11th Cir.
1991) (noting that the “district court did not instruct the jury on the possibility of awarding
nominal damages in the event of a finding of sexual harassment”).
74. 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
75. Id. at 1009; see also Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding an analogy to § 1983 more compelling than an analogy to the common
law in upholding a punitive damage award of $100,000 despite the absence of actual damages).
76. Timm, 137 F.3d at 1009.
77. Id. at 1010.
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invent “[e]xtra-statutory requirements for recovery,”78 and noted that
in § 1983 cases,79 the principle was well established that “‘when a jury
finds a constitutional violation under a § 1983 claim, it may award pu-
nitive damages even when it does not award compensatory dam-
ages.’”80 Finding “no reason” for reading a “compensatory-punitive
link” into § 1981a but not § 1983, the Seventh Circuit upheld the puni-
tive damage award.81 By referring to “compensatory,” rather than
“nominal damages,” the Seventh Circuit skirted the issue of whether
a jury should have to find nominal damages before awarding punitive
damages, concluding in effect that injury, functionally equivalent to
nominal damages, is presumed upon a violation of Title VII.
Some courts have refused to presume injury or nominal damages
upon a violation of Title VII in situations similar to Timm, and in
doing so, have given credence to the justification behind the common
law link. For example, in Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.,82 the
First Circuit faced a $300,000 punitive damage award under § 1981a
that was unsupported by either compensatory or nominal damages,
even though the jury had found the defendant liable for intentional
discrimination.83 The plaintiff relied upon the rationale of Timm and
asserted that although she had not requested nominal damages, they
were presumed upon a violation of Title VII.84 The First Circuit re-
jected this argument, holding that a Title VII liability verdict does not
compel an award of nominal damages “absent a timely request.”85
Presumably, by vacating the entire $300,000 punitive damage award
because of the plaintiff’s failure to request a simple jury instruction,
the court envisioned circumstances in which a jury might find the de-
fendant liable, as it did, but remain unwilling to award the plaintiff
even nominal damages as a token for the invasion of his or her rights.
 78. Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides a private cause of action against a state official for
“the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
80. Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Erwin v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299
(7th Cir. 1989)).
81. Id.
82. 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1209.
84. Id. at 1214–15.
85. Id. at 1215. It should be noted that the Kerr-Selgas court did not directly answer the
question of whether liability under Title VII automatically results in a presumption of nominal
damages; rather, it stated simply that nominal damages may not be awarded absent a “timely
request.” Id.
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When Timm and Kerr-Selgas are contrasted, it becomes apparent
that the Timm court’s reasoning contains a critical flaw. Although
under Carey v. Piphus and its progeny86 federal courts presume the
existence of nominal damages, and therefore injury, upon a constitu-
tional violation of § 1983,87 no circuit directly faced with the issue has
held that injury and nominal damages are presumed upon a violation
of Title VII.88 This key distinction can be explained by the fact that a
§ 1983 violation is most often based upon the deprivation of a consti-
tutional right, which is more serious than the deprivation of a statuto-
rily created right.89 In fact, the one circuit court that has directly ad-
dressed the issue held that a Title VII violation, unlike a
constitutional violation, does not mandate an award of nominal dam-
ages.90 As such, the Seventh Circuit plainly erred in its assertion that
86. 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (holding that the denial of procedural due process should be
“actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury”). The holding of Carey has
been extended to include substantive rights as well. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299, 307–09 (1986) (applying the principles of Carey to a substantive constitutional
claim under the First Amendment and rejecting the respondent’s contention that Carey was in-
applicable); Mark T. Morrell, Note, Who Wants Nominal Damages Anyway? The Impact of an
Automatic Entitlement to Nominal Damages Under § 1983, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 225, 236
(2000) (“Carey’s common interpretation permits an automatic award of nominal damages under
§ 1983 upon a finding of a constitutional violation.”) (emphasis added).
87. E.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1993); Erwin v. County of Manitowoc,
872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1989).
88. Although in Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 652 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated by
499 U.S. 914 (1991), the Eighth Circuit endorsed extending Carey beyond constitutional viola-
tions under § 1983 by holding that nominal damages are mandatory in at least Title VII claims
for racially discriminatory treatment, the decision is suspect, having been vacated in accordance
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989),
which shed doubt on the ability to bring a claim for racially discriminatory treatment under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
89. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308 (recognizing that constitutional rights are “central to our
system of ordered liberty”); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
there is a “societal interest in deterring or punishing violators of constitutional rights [that] sup-
ports an award of punitive damages even in the absence of actual injury”) (emphasis added);
Kim M. Cafaro et al., Case Comment, Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299
(7th Cir. 1985), 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 88, 102 (1986) (“The rights of equal protection and
due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment are not ‘inherently bound up’ with the
right of discrimination-free employment granted by Title VII. The rights are distinct, not coex-
tensive.”). But see Christopher J. Burke, Note, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Judicial
Scrutiny of Prisoners’ Statutory Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 482, 496–97 (1999) (noting that although “Americans are conditioned to view constitu-
tional rights as the most ‘special’ rights with which they are endowed,” in applying the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act to the prison context, “the nature of constitutional rights as compared
to that of statutory rights supports a preference for granting the latter greater application”).
90. See Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 845 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating
that “[n]othing in Carey mandates the award of nominal damages for statutory violations”); see
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there was “no reason” to read a compensatory-punitive link into
§ 1981a or Title VII but not § 1983.91
Nothing in either the plain language or legislative history of
§ 1981a(b)(1) suggests that Congress intended prevailing plaintiffs in
Title VII actions to be automatically entitled to an award of nominal
damages or equivalent presumption of injury. Nor has the Supreme
Court ever suggested this proposition. Carey v. Piphus dealt only with
constitutional violations under § 1983, specifically distinguishing the
deprivation of constitutional rights from statutorily created ones
when it emphasized the “absolute” nature of constitutional rights and
noted “the importance to organized society that those rights be scru-
pulously observed.”92 Circuit courts have likewise recognized the dis-
tinction between the deprivation of constitutional rights under § 1983
and statutorily created rights such as Title VII. For example, in Lou-
isiana Acorn Fair Housing v. LeBlanc,93 the Fifth Circuit refused to
presume the existence of nominal damages or injury upon a violation
of the federal Fair Housing Act, which creates statutory rights, noting
that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s “rights under the [Fair
Housing Act] but he did not violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional
rights.”94 At least one other circuit court has differentiated between
constitutional and statutory rights by noting that although a depriva-
tion of the former must necessarily be at the hands of a state actor,
violations of statutorily created rights such as Title VII can take place
at the hands of private individuals as well.95
also Buckner v. Franco, Inc., No. 97-6028, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7369, at *12 (6th Cir. Apr. 12,
1999) (“Since we are not aware of any prior court precedent requiring the awarding of nominal
damages to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff . . . the district court did not commit plain error in
refusing to so instruct the jury.”); Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 411 n.17 (1st Cir. 1992) (dis-
cussing the Walker court’s holding with approval), vacated by 507 U.S. 956 (1993).
91. Timm v. Progressive Steel Training, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998).
92. 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). At common law, nominal damages were presumed upon the
violation of several torts, including trespass and libel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907
cmt. a (1979). Title VII creates statutory rights, however, and absent express congressional in-
tent, no reason comes to mind for extending this practice to § 1981a.
93. 211 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1225 (2001).
94. Id. at 303; see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. Richmond, 12 F.3d 1321, 1327 (4th
Cir. 1993) (concluding that “in the absence of statutory language to the contrary” punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable unless accompanied by an award of actual damages). But see Alexan-
der v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 429 (3d Cir. 2000) (expressing disapproval of the district court’s dis-
tinction between a constitutional violation and a statutory violation under the Fair Housing Act
when determining whether nominal damages are required).
95. Buckner, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7369, at *10 (noting that “the instant action alleges a
violation of purely statutory rights under Title VII by a party not acting under the color of state
law”).
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Other concerns apart from the constitutional/statutory right dis-
tinction caution against presuming the existence of nominal damages
or an equivalent in Title VII violations. For one, the legislative his-
tory of § 1981a stresses the need for plaintiffs to prove the existence
of actual injury or loss before recovering damages.96 Juries should be
afforded the opportunity, when faced with Title VII violations that
have not resulted in compensable harm, to choose between awarding
nominal damages, which signify the invasion of the plaintiff’s rights,
and not awarding nominal damages, which would express the jury’s
belief that although the employer engaged in discrimination, this
practice was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of
any damages.97 For example, if the jury finds race or gender to be a
motivating factor in the termination of an employee, but the jury feels
that the employee would have been terminated in any case because of
incompetence, it might find the defendant technically liable, but be
unwilling to award nominal damages to signify an invasion of the
plaintiff’s Title VII rights. If nominal damages were automatically
awarded, or a court found that liability alone were sufficient to award
punitive damages, the jury would be unable to make this determina-
tion for itself.98
On the other hand, cases like Timm and Kerr-Selgas have in-
volved situations in which the jury was not actually given an instruc-
tion concerning nominal damages. One may naturally wonder why a
plaintiff’s attorney would fail to request a jury instruction concerning
nominal damages, even in the alternative to a finding of compensa-
96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
97. Not only are juries given this option when they are given an instruction as to whether to
award nominal damages, but the view is entirely consistent with the purpose of nominal dam-
ages, which are awarded “where there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 66, at 390, 392.
98. Some, such as the court in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352 (2d Cir.
2001), suggest that nominal damages are merely “symbolic,” and therefore not a prerequisite to
punitive damages. Id. at 359 (“The need for [nominal damages] in the absence of compensatory
damages disappears where the factfinder has signified its opprobrium by making an express
award of punitive damages.”). But this suggestion confuses the roles of actual damages and pu-
nitive damages. Whereas actual damages compensate the plaintiff for loss, punitive damages
punish the defendant only after the plaintiff has been found to have a valid cause of action.
Thus, even though the factfinder may signify its “opprobrium” of the defendant’s conduct by
awarding punitive damages, this award has no bearing on how the defendant’s conduct harmed
the plaintiff in the first place. As such, without a punitive damage–actual damage link, one can
readily imagine a situation in which a jury finds that the plaintiff was unharmed and deserving of
zero actual damages, but nevertheless able to receive punitive damages because the defendant’s
conduct is found sufficiently reprehensible.
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tory damages. After all, it might be reasonable to conclude that a jury
willing to find that a defendant violated a plaintiff’s Title VII rights
would be just as willing to award the plaintiff at least one dollar in
nominal damages. Incompetence aside, plaintiffs’ lawyers may be un-
willing to request an instruction for nominal damages because, if ac-
cepted by the jury, the instruction may foreclose the possibility of re-
covering “substantial money” in compensatory damages.99 Plainly,
this type of strategic maneuvering should not be condoned on appeal
by awarding nominal damages post hoc.
Understandably, not even the Timm court was willing to allow
the plaintiff’s $15,000 punitive damage award to stand without first
deciding, albeit incorrectly, that injury should be presumed upon a
statutory violation.100 So in a limited sense, the Seventh Circuit upheld
the reasoning behind the common law rule by requiring that at least
“something” support the award of punitive damages. However, it was
hasty, if not altogether incorrect, for the Timm court to presume the
existence of that “something.” The jury should have been left to de-
cide, upon a proper instruction, whether nominal damages were war-
ranted in the action. The result of the Timm court’s decision is an ef-
fective abridgement of the common law rule, having substituted, in
place of a jury, its view that the plaintiff was harmed.
CONCLUSION
The integrity of punitive damage awards depends upon plaintiffs
first successfully establishing a civil cause of action that is independ-
ent of a desire merely to punish the defendant. Punitive damages
must be doled out as a by-product of the civil justice system, not in de
facto criminal proceedings dressed up to look like civil actions. The
common law thus requires that a plaintiff be awarded compensatory
or nominal damages to be eligible for a punitive damage award. In an
attempt to circumvent this requirement, courts like the Timm court
have sought to presume the existence of injury upon a violation of Ti-
tle VII. Not only is there no precedent for such a bold proposition,
99. Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 845 n.7 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
that the reason the plaintiff did not request an instruction on nominal damages was because
“the jury might have given it, and that was a risk to be avoided by the plaintiff since she was af-
ter substantial money”).
100. Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
that a plaintiff “must suffer some injury to have standing,” and analogizing a Title VII action to
a § 1983 action, in which punitive damages may be awarded absent either compensatory or
nominal damages).
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but presuming the existence of harm when a jury has found none ef-
fectively allows plaintiffs to bring purely punitive actions in civil
courts, as well as undermines the special status of constitutional
rights. To preserve the integrity of punitive damage awards under Ti-
tle VII, a plaintiff should be required to receive compensatory or
nominal damages before becoming eligible to recover punitive dam-
ages.
